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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The provision of medical services includes several forms of care of which some are unobservable
and thus non-contractible. Several studies have examined diﬀerent mechanisms, such as physician
monitoring and/or payment schemes, which seek to encourage the eﬃcient provision of these un-
observable forms of care such as physician time and eﬀort. In this paper, we examine the role
of competition as an alternative way of dealing with this issue. More speciﬁcally, we construct a
model where physicians repeatedly compete for patients and where patients’ outside options are
solved for in equilibrium. In our model, each physician is characterized by an individual-speciﬁc
ethical constraint which speciﬁes the minimal amount of eﬀort to be provided. These ethical con-
straints allow for unobserved heterogeneity in the physicians market. By doing so, we introduce
uncertainty in the patient’s likely treatment if he were in fact to leave his current physician to seek
care elsewhere. We ﬁnd that competition between providers may serve as an important incentive
for physicians in treating their patients with desired levels of care.
Although patients, doctors and insurers may be able to observe certain components of care (such
as hospitalizations, testing, pharmaceuticals...), several valued forms of care are unobservable by
third-parties and thus non-contractible. The presence of competition and certain types of payment
schemes may, however, serve as important mechanisms to encourage desired provision of such non-
contractible care, in a setting characterized by information asymmetry. In our model, we build
on several papers (Ellis and McGuire, 1986; Ma, 1994; Ma and McGuire, 1997; Ellis, 1998; Gal-
Or, 1999) while exploiting competition between similar providers (for example, between GPs) in
a speciﬁc way. According to Gaynor and Vogt (2000), competition has been somewhat ignored in
the literature partly because of the lack of concentration in the physicians market, i.e., the market
is unlikely to exhibit anti-competitive behaviour. However, the presence of information asymmetry
between patients and physicians, the proliferation of prospective payments which may encourage
sub-optimal care, and the discretionary powers held by physicians, nonetheless point to a role for
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Provider Competition in a Dynamic Settingcompetition and/or monitoring in the physicians market. Although monitoring (either directly or
through medical malpractice litigation) may be a way to address these market imperfections, there
is still a need to study other mechanisms such as competition in order to determine how to achieve
eﬃcient provision of care.1
Our work is related to several papers on competition in the physicians market. In Rochaix
(1989), the patient’s ability to consult a competing physician imposes an implicit constraint on
his physician’s discretionary power. More speciﬁcally, physicians risk losing their patients if their
diagnosis diﬀers greatly from their patients’ prior expectations about illness severity. The threat of
losing patients leads physicians to recommend a treatment intensity that is closer to the full infor-
mation solution (a result which holds in the presence of only a small number of informed patients).
Rochaix, however, does not deal with the issue of non-observable (and thus, non-contractible) eﬀort.
In Allard et al. (2001), the authors study compensation of health-care providers in a principal-
agent framework where information asymmetry exists between providers and the regulatory agent.
In this model, physicians are diﬀerentiated by their productivity. Patients, who are assumed to be
identical, choose the physician who oﬀers them the greatest net beneﬁt. In equilibrium, competi-
tion in the physicians market equalizes net beneﬁts among patients, i.e., the ‘market constraint’
leads physicians to exert non-contractible eﬀort in order to attract patients. Our paper diﬀers
from this one in several respects, most notably, by introducing patient heterogeneity. Furthermore,
unlike Allard et al., our model can generate both treatment heterogeneity and patient turnover in
equilibrium. Finally, Ma and McGuire (1997) examine the role of competition by having physicians
compete with an exogenously given outside option (i.e., where the patient can obtain a given utility
if he decided to leave) and by introducing patient heterogeneity with respect to their out-of-pocket
cost for using diﬀerent physicians. Endogenizing this outside option is at the heart of our model.
In this paper, we ﬁnd that under certain conditions competition may lead physicians to treat
their patients with desired levels of care independently of their type (i.e., independently of their
1For a discussion of monitoring see Léger (2000). For a discussion of medical malpractice see Danzon (2000).
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Provider Competition in a Dynamic Settingethical constraint) - thus leading to stable physician-patient relationships. In the presence of non-
trivial switching costs, however, the eﬀect of competition is somewhat dampened. In such a case,
while certain patients will receive more care than others (i.e., the equilibrium will be characterized
by heterogeneity in treatments), stable physician-patient relationships still exist.2 Competition
will, nonetheless, lead to a lower-bound in eﬀort provided, where a mass of physicians will provide
eﬀort beyond what is determined by their ethical constraint. Finally, under certain conditions
such as excess demand in the physicians market or relatively myopic physicians, the equilibrium
may be characterized by heterogeneity in treatments as well as some unstable physician-patient
relationships. Thus, under certain conditions, some patient turnover will occur in equilibrium. Even
if the presence of such an equilibrium, competition will nonetheless induce a mass of physicians to
treat their patients beyond the level of care determined by their ethical constraint.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the model. In
section 3, we solve the model in a static setting. We resolve the model in a repeated-game setting
in section 4. Conclusions are drawn in section 5.
2 The Model
In this section we introduce a dynamic model characterizing the relationship between physicians,
patients and insurance providers. As in Ma and McGuire (1997), treatment following an illness
requires two forms of medical input: (i) observable medical care q, and (ii) unobservable physician
eﬀort  . Medical care q is deﬁned as any form of observable and contractible medical treatment.
On the other hand, eﬀort   may be thought of as all valued forms of care which are not observable
to third parties and thus non-contractible. These forms of care may include the physician’s time
2According to Ellis and McGuire (1986): ‘Available evidence suggests that health care consumers do a very limited
amount of shopping around among physicians, and that, having chosen a physician, consumers accept most physician’s
recommendations quite passively.’(p.144). If one assumes that competition between providers necessarily translates
itself into patients shopping around among providers, then the aforementioned evidence suggests little competition in
the market for physician services. In our model, however, it is not shopping around but rather the threat of moving
from one physician to another that creates competitive pressures between providers. Thus, as in our results where the
equilibria are characterized by stable patient-physician relationships, the physicians market may be very competitive
without ever exhibiting patient shopping.
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progress and communicating with the patient (see Wedig et al., 1989). We further assume a mixed
physician payment scheme which consists of both a per-unit-of-q reimbursement and a prospective
payment. This prospective component will ultimately serve to compensate physicians for the eﬀort
they exert, given that this form of care cannot be reimbursed on a per-unit basis.
Before competition (for patients) begins, a population of measure one of patients is assumed to
be equally allocated to a population of measure one of physicians. Competition is introduced in our
model by adopting a multi-period setting where patients can move from one physician to another.
Because we adopt such a framework, our model is best suited to potentially long-term relationships
between patients and providers (for example, between patients and their family practitioners or, in
the case of a chronic illness, between patients and their specialists).
The timing of the game is as follows:
Stage 1:
The physician-payment and insurance parameters are contracted upon. It is at this stage that
the patient purchases an actuarially-fair insurance policy at a premium α.
Stage 2:
With probability π, the patient becomes ill and requires medical treatment. If the patient is
ill, he draws θ from a known distribution of illness F(θ).3 We assume that the patient perfectly
observes his illness severity which is not observable to the third-party payer. If the patient is not
ill, the ‘period’ ends (i.e., the patient does not seek medical treatment, remains healthy for one full
period and returns, in the repeated-game setting, to stage 1 in the next period).
Stage 3:
A patient with illness severity θ seeks medical treatment. In our model it is assumed that  
and q are chosen simultaneously by the physician and the patient, respectively, i.e., neither patient
3In this setup, we can think of θ as representing a single illness with a severity distribution or a composite measure
which maps diﬀerent types of illnesses and their severity into a single dimension.
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quantity q is purchased (on behalf of the patient) by the physician at a cost of ω per unit.
Stage 4:
Once medical care and eﬀort have been provided, the patient’s ex post health H (given by
the health production function h(θ,q, )) is revealed. We assume that ex post health is perfectly
observable to the patient yet unobservable to the third party. Once the physician has treated the
patient: (i) the patient pays γpq where γ denotes the co-payment rate and p denotes the price per-
unit of quantity q, and (ii) the physician receives a net payment (p − ω) for each unit of quantity
q provided and a prospective payment δ which serves to compensate for eﬀort.6
Stage 5:
Because the patient observes his illness severity θ, the quantity of medical care q provided
and his health outcome H, he can infer his physician’s eﬀort  . Based on this information, the
patient may choose to leave his current physician. For simplicity, we assume that each period is
characterized by a new draw from the illness distribution, i.e., we exclude the ‘dynamic’ aspect of
health.7
We next describe each player in greater detail.
The Patient:
The patient per-period expected utility is given by:





C = I − α − γpq. (2)
4We diﬀer from Ma and McGuire (1997) in this respect, i.e., we relax their somewhat restrictive assumption that
the patient observes the eﬀort provided by his physician before choosing the quantity of medical care.
5Allowing the patient to choose the quantity q is equivalent to the physician proposing a schedule of treatments
and prices. Because greater levels of q are associated with greater costs (i.e., a higher co-payment), the patient will
choose the quantity which maximizes his expected utility.
6Thus, in this framework, physicians only receive payment if the patient is ill and seeks medical care.
7Because the patient draws from the illness severity distribution independently in each period, cream-skimming
issues are not dealt with here. That is, because all patients are identical before each period begins, physicians will
not be able to select less or more costly patients.
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Provider Competition in a Dynamic SettingWe assume a separable utility function for U(C,H):
U(C,H)=u(c)+h(θ,q, ),
where u0 > 0 and u00 < 0. Furthermore, in (2) C denotes the patient’s consumption while I denotes
the state-independent income. We deﬁne H0 ≡ h(0,0,0) to be the patient’s health in the absence
of illness.
The Physician:
In our model, we introduce unobserved heterogeneity in the physicians market in a simple way.
Each physician is characterized by a λ parameter where λ ∈ [0,1]. If for a given illness severity
θ, the patient were to choose in stage 3 an eﬀort e   (henceforth referred to as the patient’s desired
level of eﬀort), a physician λ would never be willing to provide less than λe  (θ).8 For example, a
physician with λ =1would never be willing to provide less than the patient’s desired level of
eﬀort (  = e  (θ)). However, a physician with λ =0could provide the minimal amount of eﬀort
possible (  =0 ).9 Thus, each physician will be characterized by an ethical constraint which gives
the minimum proportion of the desired eﬀort level to be provided. We also assume that physician
types are distributed according to a known distribution Γ(λ).
Each physician is assumed to have a per-patient per-period utility V which is increasing in
income M and decreasing in eﬀort  . Thus, the physician’s per-patient per-period expected utility
is given by:
EV =( 1− π)V (0,0) + πV(M, ), (3)
where M = δ +( p − ω)q when the patient seeks medical treatment. We assume a separable utility
function for V (M, ):
V (M, )=M − c( ),
8It is important to note that for every co-payment rate γ and every illness severity θ, there exists a patient’s utility
maximizing q and   in Stage 3. Because the desired eﬀort level h   is dependent on the co-payment rate, it cannot be
thought of as some medically-justiﬁed amount of eﬀort.
9One can think of eﬀort   =0as the minimal amount of eﬀort below which the physician’s eﬀort would be
observably insuﬃcient.
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The Insurer:
We assume that the market for insurance is perfectly competitive. The actuarially-fair health-




((1 − γ)pq(θ)+δ( (θ)))dF(θ). (4)
where q(θ) and  (θ) denote the quantity of medical services and eﬀort in equilibrium.
3 The Static Framework
In this section, we examine the static setting by shutting down Stage 5 in the game described above.
Examining our model without its competitive feature will serve as a benchmark.
It is well known in the literature that the ﬁrst-best health insurance policy would provide
state-contingent treatments (in our case, illness contingent levels of q and  ). In our case, optimal
illness-contingent levels of q and   can be obtained by solving the patient’s ex ante problem. That
is, optimal levels of q and   can be obtained by maximizing the patient’s expected utility (1)
subject to his budget constraint (2), the physician-participation constraint (that will be satisﬁed
if the physician’s expected utility (3) is greater than some exogenously given value V ), and an
actuarially-fair health-insurance premium (4). However, a state-contingent contract of this type is
infeasible given that illness severity, eﬀort levels and post-treatment health are not veriﬁable and
thus non-contractible (Arrow, 1963).
As noted above, the patient observes his illness severity and his ex post health but does not
observe his physician’s type. Also recall that the physician chooses eﬀort level   while the patient
simultaneously chooses medical care q. It is obvious that in a static setting the physician will
never wish to provide eﬀort beyond the minimum amount determined by her ethical constraint,
i.e., for a given illness severity θ, the physician λ will provide λe  (θ) irrespective of the prospective
8
Provider Competition in a Dynamic Settingpayment. This is simply because increasing the eﬀort beyond the minimum amount, which is utility
decreasing for the physician, does not yield a larger prospective payment for the physician.
For a given co-payment γ and a speciﬁc realization of θ, the patient’s expectation with respect
to his physician’s eﬀort is given by Eλ(λe  (θ)) = b λe  (θ) where b λ =
R 1
0 λdΓ(λ). Thus a patient with
illness θ solves:
max
q U(I − α − γpq,h(θ,q,b λe  (θ))). (5)
For a given co-payment γ and a speciﬁci l l n e s ss e v e r i t yθ, the equilibrium will be characterized by
homogeneity in quantities q∗(θ) chosen by the patients yet, heterogeneity in eﬀorts  ∗(θ) provided
by the physicians (where the equilibrium eﬀorts will be distributed between 0 ande  (θ)). As a result,
how much eﬀort the patient receives is simply a function of his illness severity and the physician
type he has been assigned to.
To ensure the participation of all physicians (i.e., irrespective of type), the prospective payment
must (at least) compensate eﬀort provided by the physician of type λ =1 ,i . e .δ(θ) ≥ c(e  (θ)). We
henceforth set δ(θ)=c(e  (θ)).I f θ were observable, an illness-speciﬁcp r o s p e c t i v ep a y m e n tδ(θ)
would have to be paid to all physicians irrespective of their type. However, given that the illness
severity is not observable by the insurer, the equilibrium prospective payment δ∗, which is paid to








c(e  (θ))dF(θ). (6)




((1 − γ)pq∗(θ))dF(θ)+πδ∗. (7)
Given our assumption of perfect competition in the insurance market, insurers will be indiﬀerent
between all co-payment levels (i.e., each co-payment level is associated with an insurance premium
that yields zero expected proﬁts). As a result, the equilibrium co-payment γ∗ will maximize the
patient’s expected utility. This γ∗ balances the expected utility gains of more complete insurance
9
Provider Competition in a Dynamic Settingwith the utility loss of a higher insurance premium. Thus, the equilibrium actuarially-fair insurance
premium α∗ is simply given by (7) evaluated at γ∗.
Given the results provided above, we can characterize both the patients’ and physicians’ ex post
utility. The patient’s ex post utility is given by:
U(I − α∗ − γ∗pq∗(θ),h(θ,q∗(θ),λ e  (θ))), (8)
w h e r ew er e c a l lt h a tt h eq u a n t i t yq∗ is chosen based on the realization of θ and the expected eﬀort
level to be provided by his physician. Ex post health, however, is a function of the realization of
illness severity θ, q∗ and the true eﬀort provided by the physician. Thus, if the patient’s physician
is of a type greater than the expected type (λ>b λ), then the patient will be treated with more
eﬀort than expected. In such a case, the patient will have chosen a quantity q∗ which is too large
(small) if q and   are substitutes (complements).
In this setting all physicians receive the same compensation (i.e., irrespective of their type):
M = δ∗ +( p − ω)q∗(θ)=δ∗ if p = ω. However, physician ex post utility is type dependent, i.e.,
V (δ∗ +( p − ω)q∗,λ e  (θ)) = δ∗ − c(λe  (θ)). (9)
Thus, in equilibrium, all but the physician with λ =1will receive a prospective payment which
over-compensates for eﬀort provided (in expected terms).
The above result, where all physicians provide their respective minimum eﬀort, is consistent with
Ma and McGuire’s statement that: ‘the alternative assumptions - that physician eﬀort decision is
made either simultaneously with, or after the patient’s quantity decision- are unpalatable: in both
cases, neither the patient’s quantity choice nor the payment contract can provide any incentive for
the physician to undertake costly actions.’(p. 690). In the next section we show that this is not
necessarily the case when competition is introduced in a dynamic setting. That is, we show that
physicians may undertake costly eﬀort even if physician eﬀort is chosen simultaneously with the
patient’s quantity decision when they repeatedly compete for patients.
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In this section, we turn our attention to a richer model where competition between providers plays
a central role. In a repeated game setting, the patient’s ability to move from one physician to
another may serve to encourage physicians to provide treatment levels beyond those determined by
their ethical constraints.
Although many equilibria may be supported by non-credible threats, such equilibria are of little
interest in a dynamic setting. Take, for example, a patient who follows a variant of the trigger
strategy which states that he will leave his current physician if he is not treated with desired levels
of care, i.e., if his ex post utility is less than U(I − α − γpe q(θ),h(θ,e q(θ),e  (θ))), ∀θ. This threat
of leaving is only credible if the patient is indeed willing to leave in the presence of ‘sub-desired’
care.10 Given the patient’s strategy, the physician should provide the desired eﬀort level under
the condition that the discounted expected utility of providing desired eﬀort is greater than the
discounted expected utility of providing minimal eﬀort and losing the patient. Although, under
certain conditions, such a trigger strategy may y i e l da ne q u i l i b r i u m ,i tm a yb es u p p o r t e db ya
threat which is not credible. In order to determine whether a patient’s threat is in fact credible, we
derive what the patient could expect to receive if he did in fact leave for a competing physician. We
next compare this with what he could expect to receive if he were to remain with his current one.
By doing so, we limit ourselves to examining equilibria which are supported by credible threats.
4.1 The Patients’ and Physicians’ Strategies
In this section, we deﬁne the patients’ and physicians’ strategies in a repeated-game framework.
The Patients’ Strategy:
If the patient left his current physician, he would receive at the end of the ﬁrst period:
U(I − α − γpq∗ − κ,h(θ,q∗, )), (10)
10Given that the patient observes his illness severity and decides on q, the above strategy is equivalent to a strategy
based on ex post health.
11









U(I − α − γpq∗,h(θ,q∗,  exp(θ)))dF(θ), (11)
where κ is included to represent ﬁnancial and/or psychic costs associated with moving from one
physician to another, and where ρ denotes the patient’s discount factor. In (11),  exp(θ) denotes the
patient’s expectation about the eﬀort to be provided by the outside physician if he were to leave
his current one. More speciﬁcally,  exp(θ)=
R
λ  λ(θ)dΓ(λ),w h e r e λ(θ) is the eﬀo r tt h a tp h y s i c i a n
λ will provide in equilibrium. It is important to note that q∗ in (10) is based both on the current
period illness severity and the expected eﬀort provided by the patient’s current physician. However,
q∗ in (11) is based both on the illness severity and on the expected eﬀort provided by the outside
physician ( exp(θ)).
In order to characterize the present value of not leaving, we must deﬁne how patients form
their expectations regarding future eﬀort levels to be provided by their current physician. Indeed,
recall that the patient observes θ,c h o o s e sq, observes ex post health and thus can infer the eﬀort
provided to him by his physician in the current period. Although a patient can not perfectly
infer his physician’s type, he can infer to some extent what type his physician is not. That is,
ap a t i e n tw h od r a w sθ can always infer an upper bound for his physician’s type. As a result, a
physician who provides   (given θ)m u s tb ei d e n t i ﬁed by a λ ∈ [0, / e  ] where e   is the desired eﬀort
level for the particular value of θ.W e d e n o t e λmax =  /e  . In the following sections, patients will
base their expectations regarding their current physician’s future behaviour on this λmax.11 While
basing future behaviour on λmax, rather than any other value in the interval [0,λ max], may appear
somewhat limiting and arbitrary, we show later on that these are the only expectations which
survive in equilibrium under reasonable assumptions.
As a result, if the patient remained with his current physician, he would receive in the current
period:
11Although it is possible for a physician for whom λ
maxh  (θ) < 
exp(θ) to provide, in the future, eﬀort greater than
 
exp(θ), those for whom λh  (θ) > 
exp(θ) have no choice but to do so. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that, ceteris
paribus, the latter will provide greater eﬀort in the future than the former.
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U(I − α − γpq∗,h(θ,q∗,λ maxe  (θ)))dF(θ). (13)
We now write the patient’s strategy based on (10), (11), (12), and (13). That is, the patient
will be willing to leave his current physician if:






U(I − α − γpq∗,h(θ,q∗,  exp(θ)))dF(θ)






U(I − α − γpq∗,h(θ,q∗,λ maxe  (θ)))dF(θ). (14)














U(I − α − γpq∗,h(θ,q∗,λ maxe  (θ)))dF(θ). (15)
That is, the patient will leave (stay with) his current physician if  exp(θ) > (≤) λmaxe  (θ).
The Physicians’ Strategy:
We now turn our attention to the physician’s strategy. A physician for whom λe  (θ) ≥  exp(θ)
will provide eﬀort according to her ethical constraint (i.e., λe  (θ)). By doing so, the physician
will be minimizing her eﬀort costs and will not lose her patient. However, a physician for whom
λe  (θ) <  exp(θ) (i.e., for whom the eﬀort determined by her ethical constraint is less than the eﬀort
the patient could expect if he left for an outside physician) will provide  exp(θ) if providing such
eﬀort yields greater discounted expected utility than providing her minimum eﬀort and losing her
patient i.e., if:
















future discounted expected utility associated with losing one’s patient.12 Below, we rule out the two
extreme cases where either (i) the physician does not ﬁnd a replacement for the lost patient in the






or (ii) the physician ﬁnds an immediate replacement for the lost patient (for example, because of






θ V (δ∗,λ e  (θ))dF(θ)).
4.2 Solving for the Equilibrium
In this section we solve for the equilibrium given the patients’ and the physicians’ strategies de-
scribed above. Although the equilibrium is achieved instantaneously, we adopt a sequential reason-
ing when solving for the equilibrium for presentation sake only.
4.2.1 Solving for the Equilibrium: The Simple Case
Recall that before competition begins, patients are equally allocated across physician types. Fur-
thermore, suppose, for the time being, that switching costs κ are arbitrarily small.
If the patient is currently with a physician for whom λmaxe  (θ) <  exp(θ), then the patient’s
threat of leaving for an outside physician is credible. This is because, in expectation, he can be
made better oﬀ by seeking care from another physician. Given the distribution of λs, a patient
who leaves his current physician can expect to receive in the future at least  exp(θ)=b λe  (θ),w h e r e
b λ =
R 1
0 λdΓ(λ). This is because if he left he could expect to draw a physician of type b λ who would
never be willing to provide less than b λe  (θ). As a result, all physicians of type λ<b λ will wish to
provide the eﬀort the patient could expect if he left for an outside physician, i.e.,  exp(θ)=b λe  (θ).
If the patient is currently with a physician for whom λmaxe  (θ) ≥  exp(θ), then he will not be
willing to switch physicians because he can expect to draw a physician that could provide less
than λmaxe  (θ).G i v e nt h a t exp(θ)=b λe  (θ), all physicians of type λ ≥ b λ should provide the eﬀort
12Although we assume that the physician’s future discountede x p e c t e du t i l i t ya s s o c i a t e dw i t hl o s i n gh e rp a t i e n ti s
constant and exogenously given, we discuss the likely implications of this assumption in section 4.2.3.
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Provider Competition in a Dynamic Settingdetermined by their ethical constraint (i.e., λe  (θ)) without risk of losing their patients.
Given the partial results provided above, we can see that eﬀort levels should no longer be
distributed between [0,e  (θ)] but rather between [ exp(θ),e  (θ)]=[b λe  (θ),e  (θ)]. If the λs are distributed
according to a uniform distribution over [0,1], eﬀort levels should thus be distributed between
£1
2e  (θ),e  (θ)
¤
with half of the physicians treating with precisely 1
2e  (θ). This is, however, not the full
story. Suppose now that an individual has drawn a physician who treats him with exactly 1
2e  (θ) (i.e.,
λmax = 1
2). In such a case, the patient will have an incentive to leave because he can expect to receive










8e  (θ). Consequently, all physicians with a λ<5
8
should provide eﬀort at precisely 5
8e  (θ), while the rest should provide the eﬀort determined by their
ethical constraint. Thus, eﬀort levels should now be distributed between [ exp(θ),e  (θ)]=
£5
8e  (θ),e  (θ)
¤
with 5
8 of the physicians providing 5
8e  (θ). Using the same rationale, it can easily be shown that the
only level of eﬀort which survives in equilibrium is  ∗(θ)= exp(θ)=e  (θ), i.e., the equilibrium is
characterized by a degenerate distribution of eﬀorts. It is important to note that this rationale does
not depend on the assumption of a uniform distribution of physician types.
Obviously, given that patients will always be provided with the desired eﬀort (e  (θ)),t h e yw i l l
always choose the desired level of quantity (e q(θ)). Thus, this equilibrium will be characterized by
homogeneity in treatment and stable patient-physician relationships (i.e., patients will not move
from one physician to another in equilibrium).
The above equilibrium, however, requires patient switching costs to be negligible and that no
physician has any incentive to deviate and provide a level of eﬀort below e  (θ), i.e. ∀λ,











which is simply condition (16) where the expected eﬀort level (i.e., the eﬀort the patient could
expect to receive if he left for an outside physician) is equal to the desired level of eﬀort.
As before, given perfect competition in the insurance market, patients will choose the co-
payment (and insurance premium) which maximizes expected utility. Furthermore, given that all
15
Provider Competition in a Dynamic Settingphysicians will treat their patients with the desired levels of care (e  (θ)) in equilibrium, physician
expected utility will be identical across types (i.e., independent of their λ parameter).
Proposition 1
If switching costs are negligible and condition (17) is satisﬁed: (i) all physicians (irrespective
of their λ) will treat their patients with the desired level of eﬀort e  (θ); (ii) the patients will choose
the desired level of medical care e q(θ); and (iii) patient-physician relationships will be stable.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
Because all physicians will provide the desired level of eﬀort (i.e, for every θ,  ∗(θ)=e  (θ)), they
will be compensated accordingly. Also, because the illness severity is not observable by the insurer,








c(e  (θ)). (18)
Notice that the prospective payment given in (18) is identical to that paid to physicians in
the static framework. However, unlike the outcome in the static framework, the patients always
receive desired levels of eﬀort. Thus, no physician will receive a prospective payment which over-
compensates her for eﬀort provided (in expected terms). Furthermore, all physicians’ ex post utility
will be type independent.
Because the desired levels of quantity (e q(θ))a n de ﬀort (e  (θ)) will always be chosen in equilib-




((1 − γ∗)pe q(θ))dF(θ)+πδ∗. (19)
Finally, the patient’s ex post utility is given by:
U(I − α∗ − γ∗pe q(θ),h(θ,e q(θ),e  (θ))).
13In (19), γ
∗ is the equilibrium co-payment, i.e., the one which balances the patient’s expected utility gains of fuller
insurance with the loss of a higher insurance premium.
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Provider Competition in a Dynamic SettingIn the above derivation, patients based their expectations about their current physician’s future
behaviour on λmax. We show in the Appendix that these are in fact the only expectations that
survive in equilibrium under reasonable assumptions.
In the following two subsections, we examine the cases where: (i) switching costs are no longer
trivial, and where (ii) condition (17) no longer holds for all physicians.
4.2.2 Solving for the Equilibrium: The Case where Patient Switching Costs are Non-
Negligible
In the above section we began by showing that if a patient were currently with a physician identiﬁed






ρt−1UStay >U(I −α−γpq∗,h(θ,q∗, ))−U(I −α−γpq∗−κ,h(θ,q∗, )). (20)
Suppose now that the switching costs κ are such that condition (20) exactly binds for a particular
patient i.e., for this patient the present utility loss of switching from his current physician (λmax < b λ)
is just compensated by the expected future discounted utility gains of receiving the expected eﬀort
 exp(θ)=b λe  (θ). Denote this particular patient’s physician’s λmax as λc(κ). All physicians with a
λ<λ c(κ) should then behave like λc(κ) in order to keep their patients. Consequently, a proportion
n of physicians (i.e., those with λ<λ c(κ)) should provide eﬀort such that their patients infer
λmax = λc(κ), while the rest should provide eﬀort according to their own ethical constraint (i.e.,
λe  (θ)).14 As a result, eﬀort levels should be distributed between [λc(κ)e  (θ),e  (θ)] with a proportion
n of physicians treating precisely at λc(κ)e  (θ). Under such an eﬀort distribution, however, a patient
with a physician who treats with λc(κ)e  (θ) could expect to receive nλc(κ)e  (θ)+
R 1
λc(κ) λe  (θ)dΓ(λ) if he
left his current physician. Given this outside option, all physicians providing less than nλc(κ)e  (θ)+
R 1
λc(κ) λe  (θ)dΓ(λ) would, in the absence of switching costs, want to provide this amount to retain
their patients. However, this is not the case in the presence of switching cost. That is, as before,
14As before, although it is possible for a physician characterized by a λ
max <λ
c(κ) to provide eﬀort greater than
the expected amount in the future (i.e., greater than λ
c(κ)h  (θ)), those with a λ>λ
c(κ) have no choice but to do so.
Therefore, it is reasonable for the patient to base his expectations about his current physician’s future treatments on
his current physician’s λ
max.
17
Provider Competition in a Dynamic Settingthere should exist a new critical eﬀort level (i.e., a new critical physician type λc0
(κ))f o rw h i c ht h e
patient is just indiﬀerent between (i) staying with his current physician [i.e., receiving λc0
(κ)e  (θ)]
and (ii) paying the switching cost and receiving expected eﬀort [i.e., nλc(κ)e  (θ)+
R 1
λc(κ) λe  (θ)dΓ(λ)].
Consequently, physicians with λ smaller than λc0
(κ) should provide λc0
(κ)e  (θ) in order to retain
their patients while the rest should provide eﬀort according to their own ethical constraint, i.e.,
λe  (θ).A s a r e s u l t , e ﬀort levels should now be distributed between [λc0
(κ)e  (θ),e  (θ)]. Using the
same rationale, we can identify the equilibrium critical eﬀort, say  ∗(θ) (and its corresponding
λ∗(κ)) which leaves a proportion of patients just indiﬀerent between: (i) staying with their current
physician and receiving  ∗(θ)=λ∗(κ)e  (θ); and (ii) paying κ, leaving and expecting to receive
n∗λ∗(κ)e  (θ)+
R 1
λ∗(κ) λe  (θ)dΓ(λ). Thus, in equilibrium, a proportion n∗ of physicians (i.e., those
characterized by a λ<λ ∗(κ))w i l lp r o v i d eλ∗(κ)e  (θ) while the rest (i.e., those characterized by
λ ≥ λ∗(κ)) will treat according to their ethical constraint λe  (θ).
Proposition 2:
I nt h ep r e s e n c eo fn o n - n e g l i g i b l es w i t c h i n gc o s t s ,the equilibrium will be characterized by: (i) het-
erogenous eﬀort levels with a proportion of physicians will treat beyond their ethical constraint while
others treating according to their ethical constraint; and (ii) stable patient-physician relationships.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
Recall that, before competition begins, patients are equally distributed across physician types.
Therefore, in the ﬁrst period, patients have no information regarding their physician’s type. How-
ever, they know that in equilibrium eﬀorts will be distributed between [λ∗(κ)e  (θ),e  (θ)] with the




λe  (θ)dΓ(λ). (21)
Thus, given a particular illness severity θ, the patient will choose the quantity of medical services
q∗ based on this expected eﬀort.
After one period, the patient’s physician’s λmax is revealed. Given that the patient will remain
18
Provider Competition in a Dynamic Settingwith the same physician for all periods and that this physician will provide eﬀort equal to λmaxe  (θ),
the patient will choose q∗ based on λmaxe  (θ) rather than (21).
It is also important to note that in order to ensure the participation of all physicians, the
prospective payment (δ) will need to compensate all physicians as if they were the most ethical
type. That is, in equilibrium, switching costs will lead all but the most ethical physician to be
over-compensated for the eﬀort that they will provide. As a result, in the dynamic setting, the
introduction of switching costs leads to reductions in eﬀort without reductions in the prospective
payment. The long-run actuarially-fair insurance premium α∗ will be based on the equilibrium
prospective payment and the expected medical expenditures.15
Although the eﬀect of competition is dampened with the introduction of switching costs, compe-
tition nonetheless ensures a lower-bound on the eﬀort provided ( ∗(θ)=λ∗(κ)e  (θ)). Furthermore,
as switching costs tend to zero, the proportion of physicians treating their patients with desired
eﬀort will tend to one. This may have important implications from a policy perspective. In fact,
according to our model, any mechanism which reduces the costs (both psychic and ﬁnancial) of
moving from one physician to another will lead physicians to provide their patients with their
desired levels of treatment.
It is important to mention here that, in the above, we assume that patients are risk-neutral with
respect to their health. We make this assumption uniquely to keep things as simple as possible. It
can be shown, however, that introducing risk-aversion in health is quite simple and leads to results
which are qualitatively identical to those presented in this section (i.e., qualitatively identical to
those found when introducing non-trivial switching costs).
4.2.3 Solving for the Equilibrium: The Case Where Condition (17) No Longer Holds
for all Physicians
The result in Proposition 1 where all physicians provide the desired level of eﬀort e  (θ) relies not
only on arbitrarily small switching costs but also on condition (17) not binding for all physicians. It
15Again recall that the equilibrium co-payment will be chosen by the patient to maximize expected utility.
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Provider Competition in a Dynamic Settingis possible, however, that for some physicians, providing their minimal eﬀort (λe  (θ)) thereby losing
their patient yields greater expected utility than providing their patients with their expected eﬀort
and keeping them. By basing ourselves on (16) we can write down the following condition:






V (δ∗,  exp(θ))dF(θ) − V DEV
t ) (170)
which simply states that the physician will (will not) deviate if the current-period beneﬁts of de-
viating (i.e., providing minimal eﬀort) are greater (smaller) than the expected discounted beneﬁts
of providing the expected eﬀort. By examining the right-hand side of (170), we can see two basic
reasons why a physician may be willing to deviate. First, if the physician is relatively myopic
(i.e., with a relatively small discount factor β), then the discounted expected beneﬁts of keep-
ing the patient will be too small to justify increased eﬀort in the current period.16 Second, if
R
θ V (δ∗,  exp(θ))dF(θ) − V DEV
t is relatively small (as would be the case if the physician were able
to replace his patient relatively quickly because of, for example, excess demand) then a forward
looking physician may be willing to deviate and lose his patient. We now turn our attention to the
case where condition (170) may in fact bind for some physicians.
In the absence of switching costs, let  λ(θ) denote the maximum eﬀo r tt h a tp h y s i c i a nλ is willing
to provide in order to keep her patient into the next period, i.e., for a physician λ:










V (δ, λ(θ))dF(θ). (22)
Again assume that patients are initially equally distributed across physician types and that
physicians are (for presentation sake) uniformly distributed across types. If the patient left his
current physician, he could expect to draw a physician of type E(λ)=1
2 who would never be
willing to provide less than 1
2e  (θ). Given this, all physicians of type λ<1
2 and with  λ(θ) < 1
2e  (θ)
will wish to provide λe  (θ) and lose their patients rather than provide the expected eﬀort 1
2e  (θ). We
denote the group of physicians who are willing to provide their minimal eﬀort even if this results
16If β =0(i.e., the physician does not care at all about the future) then the physician will always provide his
minimal eﬀort in equilibrium. That is, by setting β =0 , we obtain the same results as in the static framework of
section 3).
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Provider Competition in a Dynamic Settingin the loss of their patients as Group A. We further denote λa as the physician type such that the
physician is just indiﬀerent between: (i) providing her minimal eﬀort and losing her patient; and (ii)
providing the expected eﬀort and keeping her patient. Physicians with λ<1
2 but with  λ(θ)>1
2e  (θ)
will wish to provide 1
2e  (θ) in order to keep their patients. We denote the group of physicians who
are willing to provide the expected eﬀort in order to retain their patients as Group B. We further
denote λb to be the physician type such that the physician’s minimal eﬀort is equal to the expected
eﬀort. Obviously, all physicians with a λ>1
2 will wish to provide the eﬀo r td e t e r m i n e db yt h e i r
ethical constraint without risk of losing their patients. We denote the group of physicians for whom
the eﬀort determined by their ethical constraint is greater than the expected eﬀort as Group C.
Thus the above describes a speciﬁc partition of physicians by type: Group A,G r o u pB and Group
C.17
From the above description, we know that all patients whose current physician belongs to
Group A will leave. On the other hand, a patient whose current physician belongs to Group B (i.e.,
provides 1














λe  (θ)dΓ(λ) (23)
if he were to leave. Expected eﬀort (23) is simply the expected eﬀo r tp r o v i d e db yG r o u pA, B and
C weighted by the proportion of physicians in each group.
Suppose that a patient currently with a physician in Group B is willing to leave his current
physician because 1
2e  (θ) is less than the expected eﬀort provided in (23). Given the patient’s outside
option if he were to leave his current physician, a subset of physicians currently in Group B will
wish to increase their eﬀort and provide the eﬀort described in (23) (i.e., remain in Group B)w h i l e
the others will wish to provide their minimal eﬀort and lose their patients (i.e., join the newly
formed Group A). Furthermore, a subset of physicians currently in Group C whose minimal eﬀort
is less than (23) will wish to increase their eﬀort to join the newly formed Group B.T h u s , t h e
17For the case of a uniform distribution, the size of Group A plus B is equal to
1





Provider Competition in a Dynamic Settingpatients’ credible threat of leaving their current physician will lead to a new partition of Groups A,
B and C, where in general terms, a patient who is currently being treated by a physician in Group
B knows that if he left his current physician he could expect an eﬀort level at least:
Z λa
0






λe  (θ)dΓ(λ). (24)
By building on the above logic, we can deﬁne the equilibrium where: (i) the patient’s strategy
is simply to remain with his current physician if the eﬀort he receives is greater than or equal
to the expected eﬀort he would receive if he were to leave (given by (24)); and where (ii) the
physician’s strategy is simply to give the expected eﬀort (or more if her ethical constraint binds) if
the expected utility of providing expected eﬀort is greater than providing her minimal eﬀort and
losing her patient.
Given the above strategies and derivation, the equilibrium will be characterized by a unique
partition of physicians into Group A,G r o u pB and Group C, such that patients:
(i) who are treated with an eﬀort level below λbe  (θ) (i.e., treated by a physician from Group
A) will leave their current physician;
(ii) who are treated with an eﬀort level greater than or equal to λbe  (θ) (i.e., with a physician
from either Group B or C) will remain with their current physician (i.e., λbe  (θ) is just equal to the
expected eﬀort in (24));
and where physicians:
(i) with λ ≤ λa will provide their minimal eﬀort determined by their ethical constraint and lose
their patients (these physicians may be thought of as revolving-door physicians);
(ii) with λa <λ≤ λb will provide eﬀort beyond that determined by their ethical constraint
(i.e., will provide the expected eﬀort given by (24)) and keep their patients;
(iii) with λ>λ b will provide their minimal eﬀort determined by their ethical constraint and
keep their patients.
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Provider Competition in a Dynamic SettingProposition 3:
If Condition (17) binds for some physicians, the equilibrium will be characterized by three types
of physicians: (i) physicians who treat their patients with their minimal eﬀort (Group A) yet lose
their patients; (ii) physicians who provide eﬀort beyond the eﬀort determined by their ethical con-
straint (Group B) and retain their patients; and (iii) physicians who provide eﬀort levels determined
by their ethical constraint (Group C) and retain their patients. Thus, heterogeneity in eﬀort and
some unstable physician-patient relationships may be sustained in equilibrium.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
Patients who have been randomly assigned a physician from either Group B or C in the ﬁrst
period, will choose the quantity of medical services q∗ based on the illness severity and the expected
eﬀort (because their physician’s λmax is not yet revealed). After the ﬁrst period, however, they will
be able to infer their physician’s λmax and make subsequent decisions based on λmaxe  (θ).
Patients who have been randomly assigned a physician of Group A in the ﬁrst period, will
also base their ﬁrst-period’s decision on the illness severity and the expected eﬀort. Recall that a
patient whose physician is of Group A will leave for an outside physician. Thus, until the patient
can infer that he is with a physician of either Group B or C, he will continue to make his quantity
decision in the same manner. Once the patient has been assigned a physician of Group B or C and
has inferred his physician’s λmax, he will base his quantity decision on his illness severity and on
λmaxe  (θ).18
Recall that a physician will deviate if the current-period beneﬁts of deviating (i.e., providing
minimal eﬀort) are greater than the expected discounted beneﬁts of providing the expected eﬀort.
The beneﬁts of deviating may be relatively high in a situation with excess demand for physician
services (i.e., in a case where physicians can readily replace their lost patients). By reducing the
18As in the previous cases, the equilibrium prospective payment δ
∗ will need to compensate for the eﬀort provided
by the most ethical physician in order to ensure the participation of all physicians. Furthermore, the equilibrium
co-payment γ
∗ will be chosen by the patient to maximize expected utility. Finally, the equilibrium actuarially-fair
insurance premium α
∗ will reﬂect the expected medical expenditures.
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Provider Competition in a Dynamic Settingfuture expected discounted utility associated with losing one’s patient (which increases the expected
beneﬁts of maintaining one’s patient), the equilibrium will tend to that described in Proposition
1. Thus, if condition (17) binds because of excess demand for physician services, increasing the
supply of physicians may be a possible way to induce them to provide their patients with eﬀorts
which tend to their desired levels.
As stated in Proposition 3, in equilibrium, certain patients will be treated with eﬀort which
may be substantially below their desired level. These patients will leave for an outside physician.
This equilibrium is, however, based on two implicit assumptions that we have made throughout
the paper: (i) that a patient who leaves a physician is randomly assigned to another; and (ii) that
the physician’s future discounted expected utility of losing a patient is constant (i.e., is exogenous).
Both of these conditions may be questionable over the long run. Although we do not address these
issues in this paper, we next brieﬂy discuss their likely implications.
As noted above, certain physicians (i.e., the aforementioned ‘revolving-door’ physicians) will
always treat their patients with eﬀorts below their desired levels and lose them. As a result, in
every period, a certain percentage of the patients who leave Group A will be randomly assigned
to a new physician of either Group B or C. Thus, over time, the discounted expected utility of
losing a patient should increase, given that the pool of patients re-assigned to Group A should
decrease. This ﬁrst eﬀect may lead certain physicians of Group A to provide higher eﬀort in order
to maintain their patients given that the future discounted expected utility associated with losing
a patient has decreased (i.e., certain physicians of Group A m a yw i s ht om o v et oG r o u pB). On
the other hand, because a certain percentage of patients in Group A will be randomly assigned to
physicians of either group Group B or Group C, these two latter groups will ‘ﬁll up’ over time (i.e.,
physicians in these groups may no longer be able to accept new patients). Thus, over time, the
likelihood that a patient who leaves a physician of Group A will be reassigned to a physician also
of Group A should increase. This second eﬀect should lead to an increase in the future discounted
expected utility associated with losing a patient and thus lead to a decrease in eﬀort. Endogenizing
24
Provider Competition in a Dynamic Settingthe expected discounted utility of losing a patient in order to net out these two opposing eﬀects is
an interesting issue left for future research.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we examine the role of competition in the physicians market as a means of encouraging
physicians to provide desired levels of care in a setting characterized by information asymmetry.
In order to examine this role, we adopt a repeated game setting and solve for equilibria supported
by credible threats. Our framework is distinguished, most notably, from the previous literature by
this dynamic element as well as by introducing unobserved heterogeneity in the physicians market.
In the static framework, we show that all physicians will provide their minimum amount of
unobservable eﬀort, i.e., the amount determined by their ethical constraint. Consequently, the
equilibrium is characterized by heterogeneity in eﬀort (conditional on a given illness severity). In
the dynamic framework, however, we show that competition may serve as an important mechanism
to induce the desired provision of unobserved elements of medical care. More speciﬁcally, we show
that under certain conditions competition may provide enough incentives for all physicians to pro-
vide their patients with their desired levels of care irrespective of the physician’s ethical constraint.
We also show that the introduction of switching costs may dampened the eﬀect of competition
yielding some heterogeneity in treatments. Competition, nonetheless, provides a lower bound on
the provision of eﬀort in the presence of such switching costs. Finally, we show that under certain
conditions such as excess demand in the physicians market or myopic physicians, heterogeneity in
treatments as well as some unstable patient-physician relationships may be supported in equilib-
rium.
This work may have several policy implications as conditions are provided for the provision of
desired levels of non-observable (i.e., non-contractible) eﬀort. By reducing switching costs (i.e.,
the psychic and monetary costs of moving from one physician to another) and/or by increasing
the future discounted beneﬁts of keeping one’s patient (for example, by increasing the supply of
25
Provider Competition in a Dynamic Settingphysicians), one may be able to support an equilibrium characterized by stable patient-physician
relationships and the provision of desired levels of both observable and non-observable types of
medical care.
It is worth noting that our results do not depend on the patient’s observing their physician’s
eﬀort prior to treatment decisions (as suggested by Ma and McGuire (1997)) nor does it require
the patient’s knowledge of their physician’s type. These do, however, depend on the patient being
able to perfectly infer his physician’s eﬀort ex-post. Relaxing this assumption, by, for example,
introducing uncertainty in the link between illness severity, treatment and post-treatment health,
is an other interesting extension left for future work.
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Appendix
Suppose that when forming expectations about his current physician’s future eﬀort, the patient
does not use λmax but rather uses the conditional expectation of λ given λmax. That is, by inferring
his physician’s λmax, the patient knows that his physician’s actual λ ∈ [0,λ max] and therefore takes




Provider Competition in a Dynamic Settingequation (14) can be rewritten by replacing λmax by λ1. That is, the patient’s strategy is simply to
leave (stay with) his current physician if  exp(θ) > (≤) λ1e  (θ).
We can now solve for the equilibrium using the same rationale as in section 4.2.
Given the patient’s strategy, if the patient is currently with a physician for whom λ1e  (θ) <
 exp(θ), then the patient’s threat of leaving is credible. Furthermore, given the distribution of λs, a
patient who left his current physician could expect to receive in the future at least  exp(θ)=b λe  (θ).
This is because if he left he could expect to draw a physician of type b λ who would never be willing
to provide less than b λe  (θ). As a result, all physicians of type λ<1 will wish to provide the desired
eﬀort e  (θ). B e i n gp r o v i d e dw i t he ﬀort e  (θ), the patient will infer λmax =1and λ1 = b λ. By doing
so, the patient will not leave his current physician. If this is the case, however, then the patient’s
beliefs will never be conﬁrmed. This is simply because by being provided with e  (θ), the patient’s
belief about his current physician’s future eﬀorts will be based on λ1e  (θ) even though his current
physician’s actual future eﬀorts will always be λmaxe  (θ)=e  (θ) ( i.e., the patient’s beliefs are always
incorrect). Given the physicians’ actions, patients should base their current physician’s future
eﬀorts on λmax rather than λ1. A similar proof can be derived for any other belief between λ1 and
λmax.
Now suppose that the patient bases his current physician’s future eﬀo r to na ne ﬀort level λ2 <
λ1 =
R λmax
0 λdΓ(λ). By doing so, λ2 will always be less than b λ and the patient will always leave
his current physician for an outside one. If the patient always leaves his current physician, then no
physician has any incentive to provide eﬀort beyond that determined by their ethical constraint.
However, because all patients leave their physicians in every period (i.e., all physician-patient rela-
tionships are unstable), then patients’ expectations about their current physician’s future behaviour
are never put to the test. Even though patient’s expectations are never ‘disproved’, and thus are not
violated at equilibrium, they could easily be argued to be unreasonable. Furthermore, by having
such expectations, patients would systematically leave physicians characterized by a λ>b λ (i.e.,
one who could never provide less than b λe  (θ)) for the expected physician b λ. Thus, in equilibrium,
28
Provider Competition in a Dynamic Settingpatients would systematically leave more ethical physicians for less ethical ones. We exclude this
possibility (i.e., these expectations) for these obvious reasons.
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